Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry

This paper presents an analysis of the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry based on and related to the current antitrust case involving its leading producers. A spatial competition framework is employed, with brands assumed relatively immobile. It is argued that the industry's conduct, in wh...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schmalensee, Richard
Format: Book
Published: New York American Telephone and Telegraph Company Autumn 1978
Series:The Bell Journal of Economics n. 2
Subjects:

MARC

LEADER 00000nam a2200000 a 4500
082 |a H 10808 n. 2, 1978 
090 |c 20732  |d 20732 
100 |a Schmalensee, Richard 
245 |a Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry 
260 |b American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
260 |a New York 
260 |c Autumn 1978 
300 |a pp. 305-327 
490 |a The Bell Journal of Economics  |v n. 2  |x 0361915X 
504 |a Incluye bibliografía 
520 |a This paper presents an analysis of the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry based on and related to the current antitrust case involving its leading producers. A spatial competition framework is employed, with brands assumed relatively immobile. It is argued that the industry's conduct, in which price competition is avoided and rivalry focuses on new brand introductions, tends to deter entry and protect profits. Entry into a new segment of the market in the 1970s is discussed. Relevant welfare-theoretic issues are analyzed, and it is argued that the remedy proposed by the FTC is likely to improve performance. 
650 |a INDUSTRIA AGROALIMENTARIA  
650 |a COMPETENCIA MONOPOLISTA 
650 |a INDUSTRIA ALIMENTARIA 
653
942 |c ANAR  |j H 10808 n. 2, 1978 
999 |c 20676  |d 20676