Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry

This paper presents an analysis of the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry based on and related to the current antitrust case involving its leading producers. A spatial competition framework is employed, with brands assumed relatively immobile. It is argued that the industry's conduct, in wh...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schmalensee, Richard
Format: Book
Published: New York American Telephone and Telegraph Company Autumn 1978
Series:The Bell Journal of Economics n. 2
Subjects:
Description
Summary:This paper presents an analysis of the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry based on and related to the current antitrust case involving its leading producers. A spatial competition framework is employed, with brands assumed relatively immobile. It is argued that the industry's conduct, in which price competition is avoided and rivalry focuses on new brand introductions, tends to deter entry and protect profits. Entry into a new segment of the market in the 1970s is discussed. Relevant welfare-theoretic issues are analyzed, and it is argued that the remedy proposed by the FTC is likely to improve performance.
Physical Description:pp. 305-327
Bibliography:Incluye bibliografía
ISSN:0361915X