Self-knowledge and attribution of mental states in Theory of Mind
Many philosophers consider that self-knowledge reflects the particularity that we can know what we think, believe, desire, in a different way in which we know the mental states of other people. This is the claim of an asymmetry between first and third person. Several approaches han been offered in t...
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| Format: | Online |
| Language: | spa |
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Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas
2011
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| Online Access: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5232 |
| _version_ | 1837685410928525312 |
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| author | Skidelsky, Liza |
| author_facet | Skidelsky, Liza |
| author_sort | Skidelsky, Liza |
| collection | Portal de Revistas |
| description | Many philosophers consider that self-knowledge reflects the particularity that we can know what we think, believe, desire, in a different way in which we know the mental states of other people. This is the claim of an asymmetry between first and third person. Several approaches han been offered in the epistemological literature in order to account for this asymmetry. Nonetheless, unlike the expected compatibility between adjacent fields, the literature related to the attribution and self-attribution of mental states or, in general, what is called Theory of Mind, does not seem either to preserve this asymmetry or the attempt to preserve it undermines the fundamental role of the different Theory of Mind proposals. This paper will show this in two parts. Firstly, it addresses how the asymmetry thesis han been defended in the epistemological literature. The aim of this section is to offer a geography of the different approaches. Secondly, two proposals in Theory of Mind, the theory theory and simulation theory, will be evaluated in order to show why they do not account for the asymmetry thesis, and some of the consequences that would be gather from the attempt to conciliate these Theory of Mind proposals with the epistemological approaches that defend the asymmetry thesis will be analized. |
| format | Online |
| id | oai:ojs.revistas.unc.edu.ar:article-5232 |
| institution | Universidad Nacional de Cordoba |
| language | spa |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | oai:ojs.revistas.unc.edu.ar:article-52322019-05-15T18:36:36Z Self-knowledge and attribution of mental states in Theory of Mind Autoconocimiento y atribución de estados mentales en teoría de la mente Skidelsky, Liza autoconocimiento auto-atribución teoría-teoría teoría de la simulación intencionalidad self-knowledge self-attribution theory theory simulation theory intentionality Many philosophers consider that self-knowledge reflects the particularity that we can know what we think, believe, desire, in a different way in which we know the mental states of other people. This is the claim of an asymmetry between first and third person. Several approaches han been offered in the epistemological literature in order to account for this asymmetry. Nonetheless, unlike the expected compatibility between adjacent fields, the literature related to the attribution and self-attribution of mental states or, in general, what is called Theory of Mind, does not seem either to preserve this asymmetry or the attempt to preserve it undermines the fundamental role of the different Theory of Mind proposals. This paper will show this in two parts. Firstly, it addresses how the asymmetry thesis han been defended in the epistemological literature. The aim of this section is to offer a geography of the different approaches. Secondly, two proposals in Theory of Mind, the theory theory and simulation theory, will be evaluated in order to show why they do not account for the asymmetry thesis, and some of the consequences that would be gather from the attempt to conciliate these Theory of Mind proposals with the epistemological approaches that defend the asymmetry thesis will be analized. Muchos filósofos consideran que el fenómeno del autoconocimiento refleja la particularidad de que podemos saber lo que pensamos, creemos, deseamos, de una manera distinta a la manera en que conocemos los estados mentales de los otros. Esta es la tesis de la asimetría entre la primera y la tercera persona. En la literatura epistemológica se han ofrecido diversas propuestas para dar cuenta de esta asimetría. Sin embargo, a diferencia de la compatibilidad esperable entre ámbitos adyacentes, la literatura relacionada con la atribución y auto-atribución de estados mentales o, en general, lo que se suele llamar Teoría de la Mente, o bien no parece rescatar esta asimetría o bien los intentos por rescatarla le quitan un rol primordial a las distintas propuestas de Teoría de la Mente. En este trabajo se intentará mostrar esto en dos partes. En primer lugar, se abordará cómo ha sido defendida, en general, la tesis de la asimetría en la literatura epistemológica sobre el autoconocimiento. El objetivo de este apartado es ofrecer una geografía de las distintas propuestas. En segundo lugar, se analizará a grandes rasgos dos enfoques de Teoría de la Mente, la teoríateoría y la teoría de la simulación, con el objetivo de mostrar por qué no dan lugar a la tesis de la asimetría, y explicitar algunas de las consecuencias que se desprenderían del intento de conciliar estos enfoques de la Teoría de la Mente con las propuestas epistemológicas que defienden la tesis de la asimetría. Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas 2011-05-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5232 10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5232 Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences; Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Special Issue: "Intentionality and Conscience: Recent Approaches"; 34-53 Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Número Especial: "Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes"; 34-53 1852-4206 10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5232/5397 Derechos de autor 2011 Liza Skidelsky |
| spellingShingle | autoconocimiento auto-atribución teoría-teoría teoría de la simulación intencionalidad self-knowledge self-attribution theory theory simulation theory intentionality Skidelsky, Liza Self-knowledge and attribution of mental states in Theory of Mind |
| title | Self-knowledge and attribution of mental states in Theory of Mind |
| title_alt | Autoconocimiento y atribución de estados mentales en teoría de la mente |
| title_full | Self-knowledge and attribution of mental states in Theory of Mind |
| title_fullStr | Self-knowledge and attribution of mental states in Theory of Mind |
| title_full_unstemmed | Self-knowledge and attribution of mental states in Theory of Mind |
| title_short | Self-knowledge and attribution of mental states in Theory of Mind |
| title_sort | self knowledge and attribution of mental states in theory of mind |
| topic | autoconocimiento auto-atribución teoría-teoría teoría de la simulación intencionalidad self-knowledge self-attribution theory theory simulation theory intentionality |
| topic_facet | autoconocimiento auto-atribución teoría-teoría teoría de la simulación intencionalidad self-knowledge self-attribution theory theory simulation theory intentionality |
| url | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5232 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT skidelskyliza selfknowledgeandattributionofmentalstatesintheoryofmind AT skidelskyliza autoconocimientoyatribuciondeestadosmentalesenteoriadelamente |