Strategy-proofness of a class of a Borda rules / by Sengupta, Manimay

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A note of professor Peleg's consistent voting systems by Sengupta, Manimay

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The knowledge assumption in the theory of strategic voting by Sengupta, Manimay

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On imperfect knowledge and strategic voting by Sengupta, Manimay

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Monotonicity independence of irrelevant alternatives and strategyproofness of group decision functions by Sengupta, Manimay

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Implementation of social choice rules : characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium by Sengupta, Manimay

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Social decision functions and implementation by Sengupta, Manimay

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Implementable social choice rules : characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium by Sengupta, Manimay

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