Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries
Fil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina.
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
Language: | eng |
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Universidade de Brasília. Instituto de Ciência Política
2024
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/11086/551076 https://www.scielo.br/j/rbcpol/i/2018.n26/ |
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author | Moscovich, Lorena Brusco, Valeria |
author_facet | Moscovich, Lorena Brusco, Valeria |
author_sort | Moscovich, Lorena |
collection | Repositorio Digital Universitario |
description | Fil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. |
format | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
id | rdu-unc.551076 |
institution | Universidad Nacional de Cordoba |
language | eng |
publishDate | 2024 |
publisher | Universidade de Brasília. Instituto de Ciência Política |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | rdu-unc.5510762024-03-16T06:22:48Z Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries Moscovich, Lorena Brusco, Valeria Distributive Politics Federalism Elections Presidencialism info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Fil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Fil: Brusco, Valeria. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina. Governors and mayors contribute with necessary political inputs to federal politics, and the president may have no incentive or choice to exclude any of them from their alliances. When presidents have money to distribute with discretion, they do not allocate it uniformly; there are differences in funds allocated between and within provinces, as well as different municipalities within them. The objective of this paper is to explain these differences and particularly how this distribution works in countries where municipalities are not autonomous and the president cannot bypass governors. Transfer distribution patterns at two municipal levels will be explored in order to show that partisan alignments between mayors and presidents (along with other political variables, such as mayors being up for reelection) can be analyzed to explain differences in funding levels. info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Fil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Fil: Brusco, Valeria. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina. Otras Ciencia Política 2024-03-15T17:38:44Z 2024-03-15T17:38:44Z 2018 article 0103-3352 http://hdl.handle.net/11086/551076 2178-4884 https://www.scielo.br/j/rbcpol/i/2018.n26/ eng Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Impreso y Digital Universidade de Brasília. Instituto de Ciência Política |
spellingShingle | Distributive Politics Federalism Elections Presidencialism Moscovich, Lorena Brusco, Valeria Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries |
title | Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries |
title_full | Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries |
title_fullStr | Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries |
title_full_unstemmed | Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries |
title_short | Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries |
title_sort | political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries |
topic | Distributive Politics Federalism Elections Presidencialism |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/11086/551076 https://www.scielo.br/j/rbcpol/i/2018.n26/ |
work_keys_str_mv | AT moscovichlorena politicalalignmentsanddistributivepoliticsatthemunicipallevelinfederalcountries AT bruscovaleria politicalalignmentsanddistributivepoliticsatthemunicipallevelinfederalcountries |