El Catálogo Colectivo reúne los registros del material que posee cada una de las
bibliotecas de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, pudiendo encontrarse colecciones
especializadas y actualizadas en todas las áreas del conocimiento; lo que permite una
amplia visibilidad y garantiza el acceso al patrimonio documental de la Universidad.
Se encuentra disponible para toda la comunidad académica: estudiantes, docentes,
egresados e investigadores.
Si formas parte de la comunidad de la UNC también podés solicitar préstamos de material,
a cualquier biblioteca universitaria, utilizando el servicio de préstamo interbibliotecario,
independientemente de la facultad a la que pertenezcas, la carrera que curses o la cátedra
que dictes.
Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers
The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it...
The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it rests on a philosophical theory about phenomenal knowledge that seems to avoid the supposition of phenomenal concepts (versus Loar, Tye and Papineau, inter alia). I argue that Prinz’ proposal is inadequate both on empirical grounds – concerning his theory of consciousness – and on more conceptual grounds – concerning his conception of phenomenal knowledge. I conclude that the postulation of phenomenal concepts seems to be unavoidable in order to explain the nature of phenomenal knowledge.
