Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour
This paper examines two philosophical proposals about the requirements which must be satisfied in order to legitimately apply intentional explanations to non-human animals. Firstly, I evaluate Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance approach, and I present a well-known critique against it: the risk of o...
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| Format: | Online |
| Language: | spa |
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Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas
2011
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| Online Access: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5233 |
| _version_ | 1834858222320615424 |
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| author | Danón, Laura |
| author_facet | Danón, Laura |
| author_sort | Danón, Laura |
| collection | Portal de Revistas |
| description | This paper examines two philosophical proposals about the requirements which must be satisfied in order to legitimately apply intentional explanations to non-human animals. Firstly, I evaluate Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance approach, and I present a well-known critique against it: the risk of over-attribution of intentional states that it comports. Secondly, I turn to Mark Okrent’s attempt to refine Dennett’s original position, by distinguishing between an intentional stance and a teleological one. Even when this strategy seems useful to deal with the problem of overattribution of intentionality, it faces its own problems. As I will try to show, there are behaviors of non-human animals that can be explained neither by the teleological stance, nor by the intentional stance. Finally, I will suggest that, in order to overcome this problem, Okrent’s requirements for the legitimate application of the intentional stance should be revised and mitigated. |
| format | Online |
| id | oai:ojs.revistas.unc.edu.ar:article-5233 |
| institution | Universidad Nacional de Cordoba |
| language | spa |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | oai:ojs.revistas.unc.edu.ar:article-52332019-05-15T18:36:36Z Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour Explicaciones intencionales y explicaciones teleológicas de la conducta animal Danón, Laura enfoque intencional enfoque teleológico atribución intencional cognición animal Filosofía de la mente Cognicion animal intentional stance teleological stance animal cognition intentional attribution This paper examines two philosophical proposals about the requirements which must be satisfied in order to legitimately apply intentional explanations to non-human animals. Firstly, I evaluate Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance approach, and I present a well-known critique against it: the risk of over-attribution of intentional states that it comports. Secondly, I turn to Mark Okrent’s attempt to refine Dennett’s original position, by distinguishing between an intentional stance and a teleological one. Even when this strategy seems useful to deal with the problem of overattribution of intentionality, it faces its own problems. As I will try to show, there are behaviors of non-human animals that can be explained neither by the teleological stance, nor by the intentional stance. Finally, I will suggest that, in order to overcome this problem, Okrent’s requirements for the legitimate application of the intentional stance should be revised and mitigated. Este trabajo tiene por objetivo examinar críticamente dos propuestas filosóficas con respecto a los requisitos que deben satisfacer los animales no humanos para que podamos dar explicaciones intencionales legítimas de sus conductas. Se partirá de la noción de enfoque intencional, desarrollada por Dennett, y se señalará una conocida crítica en su contra: el riesgo de sobre-atribución intencional que comporta. Luego, se presentarán los desarrollos de Mark Okrent, quien propone distinguir entre un enfoque intencional y un enfoque teleológico para explicar las conductas de distintos organismos biológicos. Según se argumentará, aunque esta distinción permite enfrentar el problema de la sobre-atribución de estados mentales, tropieza con sus propias dificultades. Más específicamente, no logra abarcar ciertas conductas animales que exceden el marco de explicación puramente teleológico pero no alcanzan a satisfacer los requerimientos de aplicación del enfoque intencional. Finalmente, se propone un modo de resolver esta dificultad, consistente en morigerar los requerimientos de Okrent para la aplicación legítima del enfoque intencional a animales no humanos. Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas 2011-05-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5233 10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5233 Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences; Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Special Issue: "Intentionality and Conscience: Recent Approaches"; 54-63 Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Número Especial: "Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes"; 54-63 1852-4206 10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5233/5398 Derechos de autor 2011 Laura Danón |
| spellingShingle | enfoque intencional enfoque teleológico atribución intencional cognición animal Filosofía de la mente Cognicion animal intentional stance teleological stance animal cognition intentional attribution Danón, Laura Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour |
| title | Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour |
| title_alt | Explicaciones intencionales y explicaciones teleológicas de la conducta animal |
| title_full | Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour |
| title_fullStr | Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour |
| title_full_unstemmed | Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour |
| title_short | Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour |
| title_sort | intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour |
| topic | enfoque intencional enfoque teleológico atribución intencional cognición animal Filosofía de la mente Cognicion animal intentional stance teleological stance animal cognition intentional attribution |
| topic_facet | enfoque intencional enfoque teleológico atribución intencional cognición animal Filosofía de la mente Cognicion animal intentional stance teleological stance animal cognition intentional attribution |
| url | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5233 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT danonlaura intentionalexplanationsandteleologicalexplanationsofanimalbehaviour AT danonlaura explicacionesintencionalesyexplicacionesteleologicasdelaconductaanimal |