Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
We examine the impact of decentralized public policy in the form of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local election outcomes –the probability of reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local executive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect of...
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Format: | Online |
Language: | eng |
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Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba.
2014
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Online Access: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/14938 |
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author | Freille, Sebastián Capello, Marcelo |
author_facet | Freille, Sebastián Capello, Marcelo |
author_sort | Freille, Sebastián |
collection | Portal de Revistas |
description | We examine the impact of decentralized public policy in the form of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local election outcomes –the probability of reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local executive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect of various types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. We find that the odds of reelecting local incumbents are increasing in the incumbency dummies for both major parties. Local governments which receive a positive discretionary transfer from the provincial government have also associated higher odds of being reelected. The probability of reelection is also increasing in the difference in the vote share between the winner and the runner-up in the previous election. Finally, we find evidence that the amount of discretionary transfers per capita affect positively the probability of reelection only in those governments aligned with the provincial government. Our results are robust to controlling for other potential explanatory variables. |
format | Online |
id | oai:ojs.revistas.unc.edu.ar:article-14938 |
institution | Universidad Nacional de Cordoba |
language | eng |
publishDate | 2014 |
publisher | Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba. |
record_format | ojs |
spelling | oai:ojs.revistas.unc.edu.ar:article-149382022-04-06T21:45:58Z Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011 Efectos electorales de las transferencias fiscales intergubernamentales: Una aplicación para las elecciones locales en la provincia de Córdoba, 1995-2011 Freille, Sebastián Capello, Marcelo reelection transfers fiscal policy local governments H72 C23 C25 reelección transferencias política fiscal municipios H72 C23 C25 We examine the impact of decentralized public policy in the form of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local election outcomes –the probability of reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local executive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect of various types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. We find that the odds of reelecting local incumbents are increasing in the incumbency dummies for both major parties. Local governments which receive a positive discretionary transfer from the provincial government have also associated higher odds of being reelected. The probability of reelection is also increasing in the difference in the vote share between the winner and the runner-up in the previous election. Finally, we find evidence that the amount of discretionary transfers per capita affect positively the probability of reelection only in those governments aligned with the provincial government. Our results are robust to controlling for other potential explanatory variables. Analizamos el impacto de la política pública descentralizada bajo la forma de transferencias fiscales inter-gubernamentales sobre los resultados electorales a nivel local. Usando una base de datos especialmente compilada para este trabajo, examinamos el impacto de diferentes tipos de transferencias inter-gubernamentales sobre la probabilidad de reelección. Encontramos que la probabilidad de reelección de los incumbentes es creciente en las dummies de incumbencia para los dos principales partidos. Los gobiernos locales que reciben un monto positivo de transferencias discrecionales desde el gobierno provincial también poseen mayores probilidades de ser reelegidos. La probabilidad de reelección también es creciente en relación a la diferencia en el porcentaje de votos entre el primero y el segundo en la eleccion previa. Finalmente, encontramos evidencia de que el monto de transferencias discrecionales per capita afecta positivamente la probabilidad de reelección sólo en aquellos gobiernos locales alineados políticamente con el gobierno provincial. Nuestros resultados son robustos a la inclusión de variables de control adicionales. Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba. 2014-12-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/14938 10.55444/2451.7321.2014.v52.n1.14938 Revista de Economía y Estadística; Vol. 52 No. 1 (2014); 113-135 Revista de Economía y Estadística; Vol. 52 Núm. 1 (2014); 113-135 2451-7321 0034-8066 10.55444/2451.7321.2014.v52.n1 eng https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/14938/14900 Derechos de autor 2014 Sebastián Freille, Marcelo Capello http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
spellingShingle | reelection transfers fiscal policy local governments H72 C23 C25 reelección transferencias política fiscal municipios H72 C23 C25 Freille, Sebastián Capello, Marcelo Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011 |
title | Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011 |
title_alt | Efectos electorales de las transferencias fiscales intergubernamentales: Una aplicación para las elecciones locales en la provincia de Córdoba, 1995-2011 |
title_full | Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011 |
title_fullStr | Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011 |
title_full_unstemmed | Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011 |
title_short | Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011 |
title_sort | electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers an application to local elections in the province of cordoba 1995 2011 |
topic | reelection transfers fiscal policy local governments H72 C23 C25 reelección transferencias política fiscal municipios H72 C23 C25 |
topic_facet | reelection transfers fiscal policy local governments H72 C23 C25 reelección transferencias política fiscal municipios H72 C23 C25 |
url | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/14938 |
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