Financial intermediation and the role of price discrimination in a two-tier market /

Though unambiguously outperforming all other financial markets in terms of liquidity, foreign exchange trading is still performed in opaque and decentralized markets. In particular, the two-tier market structure consisting of a customer segment and an interdealer segment to which only market makers...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Reitz, Stefan
Other Authors: Schmidt, Markus A., Taylor, Mark P.
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Frankfurt am Main : Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009
Series:Discussion paper (Deutsche Bundesbank). Series 1: economic studies no. 13/2009
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/27667/1/200913dkp.pdf

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Financial intermediation and the role of price discrimination in a two-tier market /  |c Stefan Reitz, Markus A. Schmidt, Mark P. Taylor. 
260 |a Frankfurt am Main :  |b Deutsche Bundesbank,  |c 2009 
300 |a 27 p. 
490 1 |a Discussion paper. Series 1: economic studies ;  |v no. 13/2009 
504 |a Bibliografía: p. 18-20. 
520 3 |a Though unambiguously outperforming all other financial markets in terms of liquidity, foreign exchange trading is still performed in opaque and decentralized markets. In particular, the two-tier market structure consisting of a customer segment and an interdealer segment to which only market makers have access gives rise to the possibility of price discrimination. We provide a theoretical foreign exchange pricing model that accounts for market power considerations and analyze a database of the trades of a German market maker and his cross section of end-user customers. We find that the market maker generally exerts low bargaining power vis-á-vis his customers. The dealer earns lower average spreads on trades with financial customers than commercial customers, even though the former are perceived to convey exchange-rate-relevant information. From this perspective, it appears that market makers provide interdealer market liquidity to end-user customers with cross-sectionally differing spreads. 
650 4 |9 3394  |a INTERMEDIACION FINANCIERA 
650 4 |a ESTRUCTURA DEL MERCADO  |9 5134 
650 4 |9 8079  |a DISCRIMINACION DE PRECIOS 
650 4 |a TIPO DE CAMBIO  |9 494 
651 4 |a ALEMANIA  |9 178 
653 4 |a DESINTERMEDIACION FINANCIERA 
653 4 |a CAMBIO EXTERIOR 
700 1 |9 5691  |a Schmidt, Markus A. 
700 1 |9 1679  |a Taylor, Mark P. 
830 0 |9 4690  |a Discussion paper (Deutsche Bundesbank).  |p Series 1: economic studies  |v no. 13/2009 
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