El Catálogo Colectivo reúne los registros del material que posee cada una de las
bibliotecas de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, pudiendo encontrarse colecciones
especializadas y actualizadas en todas las áreas del conocimiento; lo que permite una
amplia visibilidad y garantiza el acceso al patrimonio documental de la Universidad.
Se encuentra disponible para toda la comunidad académica: estudiantes, docentes,
egresados e investigadores.
Si formas parte de la comunidad de la UNC también podés solicitar préstamos de material,
a cualquier biblioteca universitaria, utilizando el servicio de préstamo interbibliotecario,
independientemente de la facultad a la que pertenezcas, la carrera que curses o la cátedra
que dictes.
Many service industries, including the medical and legal professions in some countries, display a gated structure. Rather than approaching a final producer directly, a consumer will first seek a referral from an intermediary. In this paper, we provide one possible explanation for such an industry st...
|a A shirking theory of referrals /
|c Damien S. Eldridge.
260
|a Bundoora, Vic. :
|b La Trobe University. School of Business,
|c 2007
300
|a 42 p.
490
1
|a Discussion papers ;
|v no. A07.05
|x 1441-3213
504
|a Bibliografía: p. 38-42.
520
3
|a Many service industries, including the medical and legal professions in some countries, display a gated structure. Rather than approaching a final producer directly, a consumer will first seek a referral from an intermediary. In this paper, we provide one possible explanation for such an industry structure. If the outcome of a transaction depends on producer effort, which is unobservable and unverifiable, then the market may fail to generate a Pareto optimal outcome. This is the standard moral hazard problem. If consumers had a long-run relationship with producers, this type of market failure might be avoided. However, in some industries, consumers will only have a short-run relationship with producers. A gate-keeping intermediary may provide an opportunity for reputation effects to apply in such a setting. By aggregating many potential consumers, gate keeping intermediaries can create an artificial long-run relationship between a consumer and a producer. This long-run relationship reduces the incidence of shirking on the part of the producer.
650
4
|a SERVICIOS DE SALUD
|9 2439
650
4
|a ATENCION EN SALUD
|9 5018
650
4
|a SERVICIOS DE SALUD
|9 2439
650
4
|a ANALISIS ECONOMETRICO
|9 97
651
4
|a AUSTRALIA
|9 204
653
4
|a ATENCION MEDICA
700
1
|9 4652
|a Ryan, Chris
830
0
|9 4108
|a Discussion papers (La Trobe University. School of Business)
|n Series A
|v 07.05
