Two-part tariff competition in duopoly /

Built on the location model, this paper studies the rivalry of two firms in an industry through two-part tariffs. It is found that kinky profit functions are responsible for the coincidence of imperfectly competitive equilibrium and cartelization outcome. A duopoly likely results in higher entry fee...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Yin, Xiangkang
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Bundoora, Vic. : La Trobe University. School of Business, 2000
Series:Discussion papers (La Trobe University. School of Business) 00.11
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.latrobe.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/130867/2000.11.pdf
Description
Summary:Built on the location model, this paper studies the rivalry of two firms in an industry through two-part tariffs. It is found that kinky profit functions are responsible for the coincidence of imperfectly competitive equilibrium and cartelization outcome. A duopoly likely results in higher entry fees and industry profits and lower net consumers surplus than a monopoly because each duopolist has a smaller market size than the monopolist. But social welfare in the monopoly is lower than in the duopoly. In comparison with uniform pricing, two-part tariffs tend to have lower prices, more profits and welfare but the magnitude of net consumers surplus is ambiguous.
Item Description:Bibliografía: p. 28-30.
Physical Description:31 p.
ISBN:1864461993
ISSN:1441-3213