Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational, since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly. Our gametheoretic, equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants, then predation may be rational against early en...
Main Authors: | Milgrom, Paul, Roberts, John |
---|---|
Format: | Book |
Published: |
New York
Academic Press
August 1982
|
Series: | Journal of Ecconomic Theory
n. 2 |
Subjects: |
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