Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence

Economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational, since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly. Our gametheoretic, equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants, then predation may be rational against early en...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Milgrom, Paul, Roberts, John
Format: Book
Published: New York Academic Press August 1982
Series:Journal of Ecconomic Theory n. 2
Subjects:

MARC

LEADER 00000nam a2200000 a 4500
082 |a H 57020 n. 2, 1982 
090 |c 20735  |d 20735 
100 |a Milgrom, Paul 
100 |a Roberts, John 
245 |a Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence 
260 |b Academic Press 
260 |a New York 
260 |c August 1982 
300 |a pp. 280-312  |b il. 
490 |a Journal of Ecconomic Theory  |v n. 2  |x 00220531 
504 |a Incluye bibliografía 
520 |a Economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational, since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly. Our gametheoretic, equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants, then predation may be rational against early entrants, even if it is costly when viewed in isolation, because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants. Asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis, since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm's future behavior on its past actions. The analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena 
650 |a TEORIA ECONOMICA  
650 |a OLIGOPOLIOS  
650 |a COMPETENCIA 
942 |c ANAR  |j H 57020 n. 2, 1982 
999 |c 20679  |d 20679