Price wars and the stability of collusion : a study of the pre-world war I bromine industry

Between 1885 and 1914 US bromine producers colluded to raise prices and profits. This collusion was disrupted by price wars. Bromine price wars are compared with the Green/Porter and Abreu/Pearce/Stacchetti models. Some price wars resulted from the imperfect monitoring problems which motivate these...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Levenstein, Margaret C
Format: Book
Published: Oxford Blackwell Publishers June 1997
Series:The Journal of Industrial Economics n. 2
Subjects:

MARC

LEADER 00000nam a2200000 a 4500
082 |a H 57370 n. 2, 1997 
090 |c 20734  |d 20734 
100 |a Levenstein, Margaret C 
245 |a Price wars and the stability of collusion : a study of the pre-world war I bromine industry 
260 |b Blackwell Publishers 
260 |a Oxford 
260 |c June 1997 
300 |a pp. 117-137  |b il. 
490 |a The Journal of Industrial Economics  |v n. 2  |x 00221821 
504 |a Incluye bibliografía 
520 |a Between 1885 and 1914 US bromine producers colluded to raise prices and profits. This collusion was disrupted by price wars. Bromine price wars are compared with the Green/Porter and Abreu/Pearce/Stacchetti models. Some price wars resulted from the imperfect monitoring problems which motivate these models. Several empirical implications of the APS model are borne out, but the bromine industry's price wars were generally milder than contemplated by APS. More severe price wars were part of a bargaining process, in which firms tried to force renegotiation to a new collusive equilibrium with a different distribution of rents. 
650 |a INDUSTRIA DE LA DEFENSA  
650 |a COMPETENCIA IMPERFECTA  
650 |a MONOPOLIOS 
942 |c ANAR  |j H 57370 n. 2, 1997 
999 |c 20678  |d 20678