On the stability of collusive price leadership

The gains from cartel formation and the stability of a dominant cartel are investigated for the price-leadership model. We show that there is a general interest in the establishment of a cartel with the competitive fringe reaping a disproportionate share of the benefits. In contrast to results invol...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: D'Aspremont, Claude, Jacquemin, Alexis, Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold, Weymark, John A
Format: Book
Published: Toronto Canadian Economics Association February 1983
Series:The Canadian Journal of Economics n. 1
Subjects:

MARC

LEADER 00000nam a2200000 a 4500
082 |a H 26710 n. 1, 1983 
090 |c 20733  |d 20733 
100 |a D'Aspremont, Claude 
100 |a Jacquemin, Alexis 
100 |a Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold 
100 |a Weymark, John A 
245 |a On the stability of collusive price leadership 
260 |b Canadian Economics Association 
260 |a Toronto 
260 |c February 1983 
300 |a pp. 17-25  |b il. 
490 |a The Canadian Journal of Economics  |v n. 1  |x 00084085 
504 |a Incluye bibliografía 
520 |a The gains from cartel formation and the stability of a dominant cartel are investigated for the price-leadership model. We show that there is a general interest in the establishment of a cartel with the competitive fringe reaping a disproportionate share of the benefits. In contrast to results involving a continuum of firms, with a finite number of firms (each with the same cost curve) there is always a stable dominant cartel. 
650 |a ASOCIACION DE PRODUCTORES  
650 |a CARTELES  
650 |a PRECIOS FIJOS 
942 |c ANAR  |j H 26710 n. 1, 1983 
999 |c 20677  |d 20677