Voting on the budget deficit
This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal. However, if there is disagreement between current and future majorities, a balanced budget is not a politic...
Main Authors: | Tabellini, Guido, Alesina, Alberto |
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Format: | Book |
Published: |
Nashville
American Economic Association
March 1990
|
Series: | American Economic Review
n. 1 |
Subjects: |
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