Voting on the budget deficit

Voting on the budget deficit

This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal. However, if there is disagreement between current and future majorities, a balanced budget is not a politic...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Tabellini, Guido, Alesina, Alberto
Format: Book
Published: Nashville American Economic Association March 1990
Series:American Economic Review n. 1
Subjects:
PRESUPUESTO
HACIENDA PUBLICA
DEFICIT
VOTACION

MARC

LEADER 00000nam a2200000 a 4500
082 |a H 1890 n. 1, 1990 
090 |c 20348  |d 20348 
100 |a Tabellini, Guido 
100 |a Alesina, Alberto 
245 |a Voting on the budget deficit 
260 |b American Economic Association 
260 |a Nashville 
260 |c March 1990 
300 |a pp. 37-49  |b il. 
490 |a American Economic Review  |v n. 1  |x 00028282 
504 |a Incluye bibliografía 
520 |a This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal. However, if there is disagreement between current and future majorities, a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule. Under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit, and the equilibrium deficit it larger the greater is the polarization among voters. 
650 |a PRESUPUESTO  
650 |a HACIENDA PUBLICA  
650 |a DEFICIT  
650 |a VOTACION  
942 |c ANAR  |j H 1890 n. 1, 1990 
999 |c 20299  |d 20299 

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