A political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo-Ricardian framework

Individuals differ in abilities. Some are bequest constrained even in a neo-Ricardian world They vote taxes to issue bonds to be paid by taxes on future generations, thereby increasing current consumption, crowding-out capital, reducing wage rates, and increasing the interest rate. Therefore even un...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Cukierman, Alex, Meltzer, Allan H
Format: Book
Published: Nashville American Economic Association September 1989
Series:American Economic Review n. 4
Subjects:

MARC

LEADER 00000nam a2200000 a 4500
082 |a H 1890 n. 4, 1989 
090 |c 20329  |d 20329 
100 |a Cukierman, Alex 
100 |a Meltzer, Allan H 
245 |a A political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo-Ricardian framework 
260 |b American Economic Association 
260 |a Nashville 
260 |c September 1989 
300 |a pp. 713-732  |b gráf. 
490 |a American Economic Review  |v n. 4  |x 00028282 
504 |a Incluye bibliografía 
520 |a Individuals differ in abilities. Some are bequest constrained even in a neo-Ricardian world They vote taxes to issue bonds to be paid by taxes on future generations, thereby increasing current consumption, crowding-out capital, reducing wage rates, and increasing the interest rate. Therefore even unconstrained individuals are not indifferent to the size of government debt. Conditions conducive to larger debt and deficits are derived when each of the living generations determines current taxes, Social Security benefits and the national debt by majority rule. 
650 |a DEFICIT PRESUPUESTARIO  
650 |a TEORIA ECONOMICA  
650 |a DEUDA PUBLICA  
650 |a SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 
942 |c ANAR  |j H 1890 n. 4, 1989 
999 |c 20280  |d 20280